Tighter Post-quantum Secure Encryption Schemes Using Semi-classical Oracles

Name
Reelika T├Ánisson
Abstract
The random oracle model (ROM) has been widely used for analyzing cryptographic schemes. In the real world, a quantum adversary equipped with a quantum computer can execute hash functions on an arbitrary superposition of inputs. Therefore, one needs to analyze the post-quantum security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). Unfortunately, working in the QROM is quite difficult because many proof techniques in the ROM have no analogue in the QROM. A technique that can help solve this problem is the One-Way to Hiding (O2H) Theorem, which was first proven in 2015 by Unruh. In 2018, Ambainis, Hamburg and Unruh presented an improved version of the O2H Theorem which uses so called semi-classical oracles and has higher flexibility
and tighter bounds. This improvement of the O2H Theorem should allow us to derive better security bounds for most schemes that used the old version. We take one paper that used the old version of the O2H Theorem to prove the security of different schemes in the QROM and give new proofs using semi-classical oracles.
Graduation Thesis language
English
Graduation Thesis type
Master - Computer Science
Supervisor(s)
Dominique Peer Ghislain Unruh
Defence year
2019
 
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