Post-Quantum Secure Time-Stamping
Name
Raul-Martin Rebane
Abstract
Cryptographic timestamps are used as proof that a certain document existed before another. Post-quantum secure time-stamping examines whether these proofs can be forged using a quantum computer. The field is very unexplored as the primitives used in keyless time-stamping have not shown any serious weakness towards quantum computers. Until now no effort had been made towards formally defining post-quantum secure time-stamping. In this work, we define the notion of post-quantum time-stamping and examine how contemporary classical results change in this new framework. A key difference in the post-quantum setting is that we cannot retrieve multiple separate executions of an arbitrary quantum adversary. Currently known rewinding techniques allow an adversary to be ran again only under very specific conditions. We examine the possibility of combining existing rewinding techniques to prove a theorem for which there is currently no proof in the standard post-quantum model. We conjecture a rewinding construction which could possibly prove the theorem and establish a minimal open problem for formally proving the theorem.
Graduation Thesis language
English
Graduation Thesis type
Master - Computer Science
Supervisor(s)
Dominique Peer Ghislain Unruh
Defence year
2018